

Putting the P back in VPN: An Overlay Network to Resist Traffic Analysis

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The Free Haven Project

<http://freehaven.net/tor/>


July 29, Black Hat 2004

Talk Outline

- ◆ Motivation: Why anonymous communication?
 - Personal privacy
 - Corporate and governmental security
 - Note: Anonymous comm. = Traffic analysis resistant comm.
- ◆ Characterizing anonymity: Properties and Types
- ◆ Mixes and proxies: Anonymity building blocks
- ◆ Onion Routing: Lower latency, Higher Security
- ◆ Features of Tor: 2nd Generation Onion Routing
- ◆ Hidden Servers and Rendezvous Points
- ◆ Summary and Future Work

Public Networks are Vulnerable to Traffic Analysis

- ◆ In a Public Network (Internet):
- ◆ Packet (message) headers identify recipients
- ◆ Packet routes can be tracked



Encryption does *not* hide routing information.

Who Needs Anonymity?

- ◆ Socially sensitive communicants:
 - Chat rooms and web forums for abuse survivors, people with illnesses
- ◆ Law Enforcement:
 - Anonymous tips or crime reporting
 - Surveillance and honeypots (sting operations)
- ◆ Corporations:
 - Hiding collaborations of sensitive business units or partners
 - Hide procurement suppliers or patterns
 - Competitive analysis
- ◆ Political Dissidents, Whistleblowers
- ◆ Censorship resistant publishers

Who Needs Anonymity?

- ◆ You:
 - Where are you sending email (who is emailing you)
 - What web sites are you browsing
 - Where do you work, where are you from
 - What do you buy, what kind of physicians do you visit, what books do you read, ...

Who Needs Anonymity?

- ◆ Government

Government Needs Anonymity?

Yes, for...

- ◆ Open source intelligence gathering
 - Hiding individual analysts is not enough
 - That a query was from a govt. source may be sensitive
- ◆ Defense in depth on open and *classified* networks
 - Networks with only cleared users (but a million of them)
- ◆ Dynamic and semitrusted international coalitions
 - Network can be shared without revealing existence or amount of communication between all parties
- ◆ Elections and Voting

Government Needs Anonymity?

Yes, for...

- ◆ Networks partially under known hostile control
 - To attack comm. enemy must take down whole network
- ◆ Politically sensitive negotiations
- ◆ Road Warriors
- ◆ Protecting procurement patterns
- ◆ Homeland Security Information to/from municipalities, industry,...
- ◆ Anonymous tips (national security, congressional investigations, etc. In addition to law enforcement)

Existing Protections Can be Improved by Anonymity

- ◆ Virtual Hidden Networks
 - Traditional VPNs are not private
 - Anyone can see the network
 - Often adversary can see amount of communication
 - Onion Routing can provide anonymity to hide existence of private network and reduce countermeasure cost

Existing Protections Improved by Anonymity

- ◆ Location Hidden Survivable Services for
 - Homeland Security info to/from every town and industry
 - Censorship resistant publishers
 - Businesses with high value customers
- ◆ Hidden Server Properties
 - Servers accessible from anywhere
 - Resist attacks from authorized users
 - Resist Distributed DoS
 - Resist physical attack
 - Minimize redundancy, Reduce costs
 - Provide the above better than: firewalls, multiple redundant servers, physically hardened sites, IP filter, IP traceback

Who Needs Anonymity?

- ◆ And yes criminals

Who Needs Anonymity?

- ◆ And yes criminals

But they already have it.

We need to protect everyone else.

Anonymity Loves Company

- ◆ You can't be anonymous by yourself
 - Can have confidentiality by yourself
- ◆ A network that protects only DoD network users won't hide that connections from that network are from Defense Dept.
- ◆ You must carry traffic for others to protect yourself
- ◆ But those others don't want to trust their traffic to just one entity either. Network needs *distributed trust*.

Anonymous From Whom? Adversary Model

- ◆ Recipient of your message
- ◆ Sender of your message
- => Need Channel and Data Anonymity

- ◆ Observer of network from outside
- ◆ Network Infrastructure (Insider)
- => Need Channel Anonymity

- ◆ Note: Anonymous authenticated communication makes perfect sense
- ◆ Communicant identification should be inside the basic channel, not a property of the channel

Focus of this work is anonymity of the
communication pipe,
not what goes through it

Grab the code and try it out


- ◆ Published under the BSD license
- ◆ Not encumbered by Onion Routing patent
- ◆ Works on Linux, BSD, OS X, Solaris, Win32
- ◆ Packaged for Debian, Gentoo, FreeBSD
- ◆ Runs in user space, no need for kernel mods or root

<http://freehaven.net/tor/>

How Do You Get Communication Anonymity?


- ◆ Many technical approaches
- ◆ Overview of two extensively used approaches
 - Mixes
 - Proxies

What does a mix do?




Randomly permutes and decrypts inputs

What does a mix do?




Key property: Adversary can't tell which ciphertext corresponds to a given message

A look under the hood




Basic Mix (Chaum '81)



Server 1




Server 2




Server 3

Encryption of Message




$$\text{Ciphertext} = E_{PK_1}[E_{PK_2}[E_{PK_3}[\text{message}]]]$$

Basic Chaum-type Mix




One honest server preserves privacy




What if you need quick interaction?

- ◆ Web browsing, Remote login, Chat, etc.
- ◆ Mixnets introduced for email and other high latency apps
- ◆ Each layer of message requires expensive public-key crypto



Basic Anonymizing Proxy



- Channels appear to come from proxy, **not** true originator
- Appropriate for Web connections, etc.:
SSL, TLS, SSH (lower cost symmetric encryption)
- Examples: The Anonymizer
- Advantages: Simple, Focuses lots of traffic for more anonymity
- **Main Disadvantage: Single point of failure, compromise, attack**


Onion Routing

Traffic Analysis Resistant Infrastructure

- ◆ Main Idea: Combine Advantages of mixes and proxies
- ◆ Use (expensive) public-key crypto to establish circuits
- ◆ Use (cheaper) symmetric-key crypto to move data
 - Like SSL/TLS based proxies
- ◆ Distributed trust like mixes
- ◆ Related Work (some implemented, some just designs):
 - ISDN Mixes
 - Crowds, JAP Webmixes, Freedom Network
 - Tarzan, Morphmix

Network Structure

- ◆ Onion routers form an overlay network
 - Clique topology (for now)
 - TLS encrypted connections
- ◆ Proxy interfaces between client machine and onion routing overlay network



Tor

Tor


The Onion Routing

Tor

Tor's Onion Routing


Tor Circuit Setup

- Client Proxy establishes session key + circuit w/ **Onion Router 1**




Tor Circuit Setup

- Client Proxy establishes session key + circuit w/ **Onion Router 1**
- Proxy tunnels through that circuit to extend to **Onion Router 2**




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- Etc




Tor Circuit Usage

- Client Proxy establishes session key + circuit w/ **Onion Router 1**
- Proxy tunnels through that circuit to extend to **Onion Router 2**
- Etc
- Client applications connect and communicate over Tor circuit




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- Etc
- Client applications connect and communicate over Tor circuit



Where do I go to connect to the network?

- ◆ Directory Servers
 - Maintain list of which onion routers are up, their locations, current keys, exit policies, etc.
 - Directory server keys ship with the code
 - Control which nodes can join network
 - Important to guard against Sybil attack and related problems
 - These directories are cached and served by other servers, to reduce bottlenecks

Some Tor Properties

- ◆ Simple modular design, Restricted ambitions
 - 26K lines of C code
 - Even servers run in user space, no need to be root
 - Just anonymize the pipe
 - Can use, e.g., privoxy as front end if desired to anonymize data
 - SOCKS compliant TCP: includes Web, remote login, mail, chat, more
 - No need to build proxies for every application
 - Flexible exit policies, each node chooses what applications/destinations can emerge from it


Some Tor Properties

- ◆ Lots of supported platforms:
Linux, BSD, MacOS X, Solaris, Windows
- ◆ Many TCP streams (application connections) share one anonymous circuit
 - Less public-key encryption overhead than prior designs
 - Reduced anonymity danger from opening many circuits
 - (but we rotate away from used circuits after a while)

More Tor Properties

- ◆ Bandwidth rate limiting
 - Limits how much one OR can send to a neighbor
 - Token bucket approach limits average but permits bursts
- ◆ Circuit and stream level throttling
 - Controls congestion
 - Mitigates denial of service that a single circuit can do
- ◆ Stream integrity checks
 - Onion Routing uses stream ciphers
 - We must prevent, e.g., reasonable guess attack
 - XOR out 'dir ' and XOR in 'rm *'

Generations 0 and 1 Circuit Setup



- ◆ Each layer of the onion identifies the next hop in the route and contains the cryptographic keys to be used at that node.

More Tor Advantages

- ◆ No need to keep track of onions to prevent replay
 - There are no onions anymore
 - Even a replayed create cell will result in a new session key at an honest onion router
- ◆ Perfect Forward Secrecy
 - Storing all traffic sent to a node and later breaking its public key will not reveal encrypted content
- ◆ Can adapt to network dynamics better
 - Down exit node or unusable exit policy does not require building whole new circuit

Numbers and Performance

- ◆ Original onion routing ran for two years (1998 - 2000)
 - 4 nodes running at a single location
 - During final months processed over 50K Web connections/day from a total of 60K IP addresses worldwide
- ◆ Current 2nd generation design running since October 2003
 - c. 30 nodes scattered through US (20) and outside (10)
 - Hundreds (thousands?) of users
 - Average node processes 1 GB / day application cells
 - Up from .5 GB / week a month or two ago
 - Network has never been down

Latency Tests


- ◆ 4 node test network on single heavily loaded 1 GHz Athlon
 - Download 60MB file (108 times over 54 hours)
 - Avg. 300 sec/download vs. 210 sec/download without Tor
- ◆ Beta network test
 - Download cnn.com (55KB)
 - Median of 2.7 sec through Tor vs. 0.3 sec direct
 - Fastest through Tor was 0.6 sec

Location Hidden Servers

- ◆ Alice can connect to Bob's server without knowing where it is or possibly who he is
- ◆ Can provide servers that
 - Are accessible from anywhere
 - Resist censorship
 - Require minimal redundancy for resilience in denial of service (DoS) attack
 - Can survive to provide selected service even during full blown distributed DoS attack
 - Resistant to physical attack (you can't find them)
- ◆ How is this possible?


Location Hidden Servers

1. Server Bob creates onion routes to **Introduction Points (IP)**




Location Hidden Servers

1. Server Bob creates onion routes to **Introduction Points (IP)**
2. Bob gets **Service Descriptor** incl. Intro Pt. addresses to Alice
 - In this example gives them to **Service Lookup Server**




Location Hidden Servers

2'. Alice obtains Service Descriptor (including Intro Pt. address) at Lookup Server




Location Hidden Servers

3. Client Alice creates onion route to Rendezvous Point (RP)




Location Hidden Servers

3. Client Alice creates onion route to **Rendezvous Point (RP)**
4. Alice sends RP addr. and any authorization through IP to Bob




Location Hidden Servers

5. If Bob chooses to talk to Alice, connects to Rendezvous Point



Location Hidden Servers

5. If Bob chooses to talk to Alice, connects to Rendezvous Point
6. Rendezvous point mates the circuits from Alice and Bob



How do we compare Tor's security?

Assume the adversary owns c of the n nodes.

(he can choose which)

What's the chance for a random Alice talking to a random Bob that the adversary learns they are linked?

- ◆ Freedom, Tor: c^2/n^2 (10 of 100 \Rightarrow 1%)
- ◆ Peekabooby, six-four, etc: c/n (10 of 100 \Rightarrow 10%)
- ◆ Jap (one cascade): 1 if $c > 1$
- ◆ Jap (many cascades): $c^2/(n/2)^2$ (10 of 100 \Rightarrow 4%)
- ◆ Anonymizer: 1 if $c > 0$

Tradeoffs

- ◆ Low-latency (Tor) vs. high-latency (Mixminion)
- ◆ Packet-level vs stream-level capture
- ◆ Padding vs. no padding (mixing, traffic shaping)
- ◆ UI vs. no UI
- ◆ AS-level paths and proximity issues
- ◆ Incentives to run servers (volunteers, pay; security issues)
- ◆ Enclave-level onion routers / proxies
- ◆ Path length? (3 hops, don't reuse nodes)
- ◆ P2P network vs. static network

Future Work

- ◆ Design and build distributed directory management?
- ◆ Restricted-route (non-clique) topology
 - To scale beyond hundreds of nodes and 10Ks of users
(We should have such problems)
- ◆ Make it all work better
- ◆ Certification and Accreditation: Common Criteria
- ◆ More theoretical work
 - Midlatency synchronous batch netmixes?!?

Get the Code, Run a Node! (or just surf the web anonymously)

- ◆ Original Onion Routing design is patented
 - 2001 Edison Patent Award
- ◆ Current system code freely available (mod. BSD license)
- ◆ Visit official site <http://www.onion-router.net/>
- ◆ Visit <http://freehaven.net/tor/> to download design paper, system spec, code, see the list of current nodes, etc.
- ◆ Comes with a specification – the JAP folks implemented a compatible Tor client in Java