### Tor: Anonymous Communications for the US Dept of Defense ... and you.

Roger Dingledine The Free Haven Project http://tor.eff.org/

#### **Tor: Big Picture**

- Freely available (Open Source), unencumbered.
- Comes with a spec and full documentation: German universities implemented compatible Java Tor clients; researchers use it to study anonymity.
- Chosen as anonymity layer for EU PRIME project.
- 200000+ active users.
- PC World magazine named Tor one of the Top 100 Products of 2005.


# Informally: anonymity means you can't tell who did what

"Who wrote this blog post?"


"Who's been viewing my webpages?"

"Who's been emailing patent attorneys?"

### Formally: anonymity means indistinguishability within an "anonymity set"




# We have to make some assumptions about what the attacker can do.




Etc, etc.

### Anonymity isn't cryptography: Cryptography just protects contents.



### Anonymity isn't steganography: Attacker can tell that Alice is talking; just not to whom.



(Strong high-bandwidth steganography may not exist.)

#### Anonymity isn't just wishful thinking...

"You can't prove it was me!"

"Promise you won't look!"

"Promise you won't remember!"

"Promise you won't tell!"

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"I didn't write my name on it!"

"Isn't the Internet already anonymous?"

#### ...since "weak" anonymity... isn't.

"You can't prove it was me!"

Proof is a very strong word. With statistics, suspicion becomes certainty.

Will others parties have the ability and incentives to keep their promises?

"Promise you won't look!"
"Promise you won't remember!"

"Promise you won't tell!"


"I didn't write my name on it!"


Not what we're talking about.


Nope! (More info later.)

"Isn't the Internet already anonymous?"


# Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.








# Regular citizens don't want to be watched and tracked.



# Businesses need to keep trade secrets.




"Oh, your employees are reading our patents/jobs page/product sheets?"

"Hey, it's Alice! Give her the 'Alice' version!"

"Wanna buy a list of Alice's suppliers? What about her customers? What about her engineering department's favorite search terms?"

### Law enforcement needs anonymity to get the job done.




"Why is alice.localpolice.gov reading my website?"

"Why no, alice.localpolice.gov! I would never sell counterfeits on ebay!"


"Is my family safe if I go after these guys?"

"Are they really going to ensure my anonymity?"


### **Governments need anonymity** for their security




### You can't get anonymity on your own: private solutions are ineffective...




#### ... so, anonymity loves company!




#### Yes, bad people need anonymity too. But they are *already* doing well.




### **Current situation: Bad people on the Internet are doing fine**




IP addresses can be enough to bootstrap knowledge of identity.





...and more!

## Low-latency systems are vulnerable to end-to-end correlation attacks.



These attacks work in practice. The obvious defenses are expensive (like high-latency), useless, or both.


#### Still, we focus on low-latency, because it's more useful.

*Interactive apps:* web, IM, VOIP, ssh, X11, ... *# users:* millions?

Apps that accept multi-hour delays and high bandwidth
overhead: email, sometimes.
# users: tens of thousands at most?


And if anonymity loves company....?

# The simplest designs use a single relay to hide connections.




(ex: some commercial proxy providers)

# But an attacker who sees Alice can see what she's doing.




# Add encryption to stop attackers who eavesdrop on Alice.




(ex: some commercial proxy providers)

# But a single relay is a single point of failure.





Eavesdropping the relay works too.

## So, add multiple relays so that no single one can betray Alice.




# A corrupt first hop can tell that Alice is talking, but not to whom.







#### Alice makes a session key with R1




## Alice makes a session key with R1 ...And then tunnels to R2




#### Alice makes a session key with R1 ...And then tunnels to R2...and to R3




#### Alice makes a session key with R1 ...And then tunnels to R2...and to R3




# Can multiplex many connections through the encrypted circuit



#### Tor anonymizes TCP streams only: it needs other applications to clean high-level protocols.



# We added a control protocol for external GUI applications.




#### Usability for server operators is key.


- Rate limiting: eating too much bandwidth is rude!
- Exit policies: not everyone is willing to emit arbitrary traffic.

```
allow 18.0.0.0/8:*
allow *:22
allow *:80
reject *:*
```

# Server discovery must not permit liars to impersonate the whole network.




1. Alice says, "Describe the network!"




2. Alice is now in trouble.


### Server discovery is hard because misinformed clients lose anonymity.



# Early Tor versions used a trivial centralized directory protocol.




### We redesigned our directory protocol to reduce trust bottlenecks.



(Also uses less bandwidth!) 43


# Tor implements responder anonymity with hidden services.



All these connections are anonymized.

# Tor implements responder anonymity with hidden services.

Directory




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
# Tor implements responder anonymity with hidden services.

Bidirectional anonymity!

(provides uptime, linked to service)



# We're currently the largest strong anonymity network ever deployed.






A > 200,000 in a week




#### Growth in servers is increasing.




Routers ±

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#### Bandwidth capacity is increasing.




### Problem: Abusive users get the whole network blocked.




#### Minimize scope of blocking?

#### Problem: China is hard to beat. They can just block the whole network.



They don't, yet. But when they do...?

#### Can we get a large number of semisecret relays for China?



#### Next steps

- Usability: interfaces, installers, supporting applications (and Windows stability).
- Incentives: need to make it easier to be a server.
- Design for scalability and decentralization tens of thousands of servers, millions of users.
- Hidden services need to be faster / more stable / more secure.
- More research on anonymity attacks.
- Documentation and user support.

#### Questions?

- Tor: http://tor.eff.org/
  Try it out; want to run a server?
- Anonymity bibliography: http://freehaven.net/anonbib/