

# Usable Interfaces for Anonymous Communication


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<http://tor.eff.org/>

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
# Public Networks are Vulnerable to Traffic Analysis

- ◆ In a Public Network (Internet):
- ◆ Packet (message) headers identify recipients
- ◆ Packet routes can be tracked



**Encryption does *not* hide routing information.**

# Basic Anonymizing Proxy



- Channels appear to come from proxy, **not** true originator
- Appropriate for Web connections, etc.:  
SSL, TLS, SSH (lower cost symmetric encryption)
- Examples: The Anonymizer
- Advantages: Simple, Focuses lots of traffic for more anonymity
- **Main Disadvantage: Single point of failure, compromise, attack**

# Who uses Tor?

- ◆ Journalists, Dissidents, Whistleblowers
- ◆ Censorship resistant publishers/readers (news sites, chess sites)
- ◆ Socially sensitive communicants: cancer, etc
- ◆ Ordinary citizens (protection from profiling, from your boss/neighbor/school)
- ◆ Law Enforcement (anonymous tips, researching places safely)
- ◆ Corporations (procurement, road warriors, competitive analysis)
- ◆ Governments (soldiers, intelligence agencies)


Focus of Tor is anonymity of the  
communication pipe,  
not what goes through it

# Numbers and Performance

- ◆ Running since October 2003
- 250 nodes on five continents (North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Australia)
- Volunteer-based infrastructure
- Fifty thousand+ (?) users
- Nodes process 1-90 GB / day application cells
- Network has never been down

# Tor Circuit Usage

- Client Proxy establishes session key + circuit w/ **Onion Router 1**
- Proxy tunnels through that circuit to extend to **Onion Router 2**
- Etc
- Client applications connect and communicate over Tor circuit



# The Tor Client

- ◆ Works like a socks proxy. So you just configure your applications to use it.
- ◆ This is great, when it works. It runs in the background, you never need to see it.
- ◆ But: when it stops working, what has gone wrong?
- ◆ And: if it's working “too” well, are you really using it?



# EFF Tor Gui Contest!

- ◆ Details coming soon.
- ◆ Two phases:
  - Part one: sketches (September)
  - Part two: implementation (January)
- ◆ Winners announced at SOUPS 2006?

# The Tor controller

- ◆ Client listens on a local port
- ◆ Other application(s) can connect and talk to it.
- ◆ Learn about status, get event messages (bandwidth used, logs, new servers we just learned about)
- ◆ Read and change config options
- ◆ Choose paths for each request (think about the satellite map from *Sneakers*)
- ◆ Launch Tor, put it on the system tray, shut it down, etc.
- ◆ Auto-configure applications to use / stop using it.

## Use case 1: “it doesn't work”

- ◆ Don't have a working directory yet
- ◆ Can't get a working directory
- ◆ Your Internet connection is not on
- ◆ The Tor network is busted
- ◆ The exit node you picked is broken
- ◆ ...

## Use case 2: “it works too well”

- ◆ How do you know if your applications aren't using it?
- ◆ Need feedback
  - Bandwidth graph?
  - Look at unencrypted stuff leaving the network?

# Green bubble in system tray

- ◆ Flashes, turns red, etc if you need to know something.
- ◆ Leverage how people deal with network connection problems already.
- ◆ Bandwidth graph: show Tor usage, but also **non-Tor** usage. Show by port/application for experts? Because some things should go over Tor and some shouldn't. Let user configure which apps are which.

## Etc

- ◆ Feedback should not just be informative, but give you meaningful choices for addressing problems. The other apps we recommend don't do this!
- ◆ Need to lower the barrier to being a **server**. Even experienced users really want this.
- ◆ Would be good to do configuration changes via web interface, like privoxy does.
- ◆ (Require all users to use Firefox if they want to configure Tor?)

# Let people pick/see their paths

- ◆ They want this to exit in different countries, etc – censorship resistance, not anonymity.
- ◆ But give them good defaults.
- ◆ And give them some intuition about security issues.
- ◆ “Mental model” -- Tor has multiple hops, many users don't expect/realize this.

## Etc

- ◆ “sockscap” interface: drag-and-drop application to “torify” it.
- ◆ A single Tor client may have many users. So plenty of work for next year too.
- ◆ Need user studies!